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PUBLIC WELFARE AND THE JUDICIAL
OVER-ENFORCEMENT OF Socio-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN HONG KONG
O1
Po Jen Yap and Thomas Wong*
This comment argues that the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) in Kong Yunming
has erred insofar as it applied the proportionality analysis vis-i-vis any restriction
placed on the Art 36 right to social welfare. Even if the CFA was right to
apply the proportionality analysis, it is argued that there is a rational connection
between the 7-year residence requirement and the Government's aim of
ensuring the sustainability of the welfare system by addressing the problems
raised by the following issues: (a) immigration from the Mainland under the
One-Way Permit scheme; (b) Hong Kong's ageing population; and (c) the
rise in Comprehensive Social Security Assistance Scheme expenditure. Finally,
even if the impugned 7-year residence requirement was unconstitutional, the
CFA should have issued a temporary suspension order, rather than restore the
1 -year residence requirement.
Introduction
Most recently, in Kong Yunming v Director of Social Welfare,' the Court
of Final Appeal (CFA) unanimously invalidated the Hong Kong
Government's policy that required all recipients of the Comprehensive
Social Security Assistance Scheme (CSSA) to have been a Hong Kong
resident for at least 7 years (7-year Rule).
In essence, the CFA held that Art 36' of the Basic Law conferred
a right to the social welfare benefits under the CSSA as it stood on 1
July 1997, subject to the Government's power to modify those benefits
pursuant to Art 1453 of the Basic Law. Furthermore, any restriction
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1 [2014] 1 HKC 518 (CFA).
2 Article 36 of the Basic Law reads: Hong Kong residents shall have the right to social welfare
in accordance with law. The welfare benefits and retirement security of the labor force shall be
protected by law.
Article 145 of the Basic Law reads: On the basis of the previous social welfare system, the
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, formulate
policies on the development and improvement of this system in the light of the economic
conditions and social needs.
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on the social welfare right conferred by Art 36 must satisfy the
proportionality analysis. Although the CFA accepted that the financial
sustainability of the social security system would be a legitimate aim
of the impugned policy, the Court concluded that there was no rational
connection between the 7-year Rule and the three related principal
factors that the Government argued had contributed to the need for
additional measures to safeguard the system's sustainability: (a) the
policy of accepting immigrants from the Mainland under the One-Way
Permit (OWP) scheme; (b) Hong Kong's ageing population; and (c) the
rise in expenditure on CSSA.4 Even if such a rational connection could
be established, the CFA held that the 7-year Rule was disproportionate
and manifestly without reasonable foundation.' As a result, the 7-year
Rule was declared unconstitutional and the CFA restored the pre-
existing residence requirement of 1 year.
The facts and procedural history of the case may be briefly stated.
In 2006, the applicant, a Mainland immigrant who was in Hong Kong
on an OWP, applied for CSSA but her application was refused because
she did not satisfy the 7-year residence requirement in Hong Kong.
She subsequently brought judicial review proceedings to challenge the
Director of Social Welfare's decision on the ground that the 7-year Rule
was inconsistent with, inter alia, Arts 36 and 145 of the Basic Law. The
Court of First Instance (CFI) dismissed her application for judicial review.
The CFI held that the 7-year Rule was a permissible restriction on Art
36 since it was, in accordance with Art 145 of the Basic Law, designed to
develop and improve the pre-existing social welfare system in response
to the prevailing economic condition and social needs.6 The Court of
Appeal subsequently dismissed the appellant's appeal,' but the applicant
eventually succeeded before the CFA.
In this Comment, we shall advance the following arguments. First,
the CFA has erred insofar as it applied the proportionality analysis
vis-h-vis any restriction placed on the Art 36 right to social welfare.
Second, even if the CFA was right to apply the proportionality analysis,
we would argue that there is a rational connection between the 7-year
Rule and the Government's aim of ensuring the sustainability of the
welfare system by addressing the problems raised by the following issues:
(a) immigration from the Mainland under the OWP scheme; (b) Hong
Kong's ageing population; and (c) the rise in expenditure on CSSA.
4 Kong Yunming (CFA) (n 1 above), [53].
1 Ibid., [143].
6 [2009] 4 HKLRD 382.
[2012] 4 HKC 180 (CA).
Third, even if the impugned 7-year Rule was unconstitutional, the CFA
should have issued a temporary suspension order, rather than restore
the 1-year residence requirement. These arguments would be examined
in turn.
Article 36 and the Proportionality Analysis
The CFA held that any restriction placed on the right to social welfare as
protected under Art 36 "is subject to constitutional review by the Courts
on the basis of a proportionality analysis".8 Unfortunately, as Counsel
for the Director of Social Welfare had accepted this, the Court did not
further explain why this should be so.
As the court of final resort in Hong Kong, the CFA was certainly
entitled to decide that the proportionality analysis be used to assess
any limitations on Art 36 rights, if it so chooses. But we would like to
highlight that it is not self-evident why the proportionality analysis is the
applicable legal test for assessing such restrictions.
The Art 36 right to social welfare is an exclusive Basic Law right, ie a
right that is only found in the Basic Law and not in the Hong Kong Bill of
Rights. For exclusive Basic Law rights, the CFA in Gurung Kesh Bahadur
v Director of Immigration has so observed:
"The question of whether rights found only in the Basic Law can be
restricted and if so the test for judging permissible restrictions would
depend on the nature and subject matter of the rights in issue".9
On the facts in Gurung Kesh Bahadur, the CFA was careful not to decide
explicitly whether the proportionality analysis applied to assessing
restrictions on the constitutional right to travel, 0 an exclusive Basic Law
right.
Therefore, while it is possible for the CFA to apply the proportionality
analysis to restrictions on exclusive Basic Law rights, according to Gurung
Kesh Bahadur, it does not have to be so. One must also note that, prior to
Kong Yunming, the CFA has only the applied the proportionality analysis
vis-h-vis restrictions on rights that are protected both in the Basic Law
I Kong Yunming (CFA) (n 1 above), [36].
9 (2002) 5 HKCFAR 480, [28].
o Article 31 of the Basic Law reads: Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of movement within
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and freedom of emigration to other countries
and regions. They shall have freedom to travel and to enter or leave the Region. Unless
restrained by law, holders of valid travel documents shall be free to leave the Region without
special authorization.
Vol 44 Part 1 Judicial Over-enforcement of Social Welfare Rights 43
44 Po Jen Yap and Thomas Wong (2014) HKLJ
and in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, and has never done so for exclusive
Basic Law rights."
Furthermore, in assessing the "nature and subject matter of the rights
in issue"' 2 so as to determine the test for judging permissible restrictions,
one naturally has to examine the text of Art 36 itself. Article 36 states that
Hong Kong residents shall have the right to social welfare "in accordance
with law". In particular, the CFA in Shum Kwok Sher v HKSAR, observed
as follows:
"[I]t is now widely recognized that the expression 'prescribed by law', when
used in a context such as Art 39 of the Basic Law, mandates the principle
of legal certainty. This principle is likewise incorporated in the expression
'according to law' in Art 11(1) of the Bill [of Rights Ordinance]".13
According to the CFA in Shum Kwok Sher, the principle of legal
certainty incorporated in the expression "according to law" merely
requires the law to be adequately accessible, ie the citizen must be able
to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal
rules applicable to a given case, and that the law be formulated with
sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct." If this
is the reading the CFA has given to the term "according to law" under
the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, surely the same meaning can be given to
the term "in accordance with law" under Art 36. If so, any restriction on
Art 36 rights need only to satisfy the principle of legal certainty as laid
out in Shum Kwok Sher, and a proportionality analysis can be avoided
altogether.
Rational Connection between the 7-year Rule and the Government's
Aims of Addressing Issues Concerning: (a) Mainland Immigration
under the OWP Scheme; (b) Hong Kong's Ageing Population; and
(c) the Rise in CSSA Expenditure
Nevertheless, even if the CFA was right to apply the proportionality
analysis and the concomitant "rational connection test" to assess the
" One must note that in Official Receiver and Trustee in Bankruptcy of Chan Wing Hing v Chan
Wing Hing (2006) 9 HKCFAR 545, the CFA changed its mind about treating Art 31 as an
exclusive Basic Law right and applied the proportionality analysis to assess a limitation on the
right to travel as protected under Art 31 of the Basic Law and the freedom to leave Hong Kong
as protected under Art 8(2) of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights. The CFA, in particular, held that
the difference between both terms were "immaterial" and "it will be convenient to refer to the
right in both instruments simply as 'the right to travel"'.
12 Gurung Kesh Bahadur (n 9 above), [28].
1 (2002) 5 HKCFAR 381, [60].
1 Ibid., [63].
constitutionality of the 7-year Rule, we would nevertheless argue that
a rational nexus can be established between the 7-year Rule and the
Government's avowed legitimate aim of ensuring the sustainability of the
welfare system by addressing the problems raised by the following issues:
(a) Mainland immigration under the OWP scheme; (b) Hong Kong's
ageing population and (c) the rise in CSSA expenditure. These principal
justifications would now be examined in turn.
3(a) 7-year Rule and the OWP scheme
The CFA first found that there was no rational connection between the
7-year Rule and the avowed legitimate aim since the 7-year Rule conflicted
with the OWP scheme. According to the CFA, the purpose of the OWP
scheme is "the promotion of family reunion, respecting the right of abode
of children of Hong Kong permanent residents under the Basic Law"."
Although new Mainland immigrants under 18 years of age are exempted
from the 7-year Rule, there was no such exemption for Mainland parents
who had come to take care of these minors. As observed by the CFA, the
7-year Rule was thus "counterproductive"16 as it deterred potential new
arrivals who were without sufficient income to meet their basic needs in
Hong Kong and this Rule therefore conflicted with the OWP policy of
family union."
With respect, the CFA has erred in finding that the OWP scheme
provided "no support for the existence of any rational connection""
and that the "policies underlying the OWP scheme militate against
that restriction"." Undeniably, a key purpose of the OWP scheme is
the promotion of family reunion. But that is not the only purpose of the
scheme. If the sole purpose of the OWP scheme was to promote family
reunion, there should not be any daily quota of Mainland arrivals at all.
After all, any such restriction on the number of daily Mainland arrivals
would impede family reunion. But the fact is, since 1995, the OWP scheme
has had a daily quota of 150.20 The existence of the daily quota suggests
that the OWP scheme also aims to ensure the orderly admission of new
arrivals and to prevent the local infrastructure in Hong Kong from being
overburdened by the influx of Mainland immigration. Indeed, according
1s Kong Yunming (CFA) (n 1 above), [61].
16 Ibid., [641.
17 Ibid., [62], [63] and [140].
1 Ibid., [66].
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., [57].
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to the Task Force on Population Policy, whose Report was cited by the
CFA, in implementing the OWP, "a proper balance has to be struck
between orderly admission of new arrivals from the Mainland, both
children and spouses, and upholding family unity"." Therefore, since
another central purpose of the OWP was to ensure the "orderly admission
of new arrivals" into Hong Kong, it would be perfectly rational for the
Government to safeguard the local infrastructure, which includes the
welfare system in Hong Kong, from being overburdened, an objective
that is wholly consistent with the avowed purpose of the 7-year Rule,
namely to ensure the sustainability of the welfare system. Thus, there is
no conflict between the 7-year Rule and the OWP scheme.
3 (b) 7-year Rule and the governmental policy of responding to
Hong Kong's ageing population
The CFA also found that there was no rational connection between
the 7-year Rule and the avowed legitimate aim since the 7-year Rule
conflicted with the governmental policy of responding to Hong Kong's
ageing population problem. According to the CFA, the 7-year Rule
"does not affect all elderly CSSA recipients, but only new arrivals who
are elderly", and elderly immigrants are allotted a small sub-quota under
the OWP scheme." Furthermore, only a small proportion of the elderly
persons who entered under the OWP scheme received CSSA. Therefore,
according to the CFA, savings to the CSSA expenditure from elderly new
arrivals "would be minimal and could hardly qualify as a response to the
ageing population problem, aimed at ensuring the sustainability of the
welfare system".
Unfortunately, the CFA has failed to fully grasp the Government's
argument on Hong Kong's ageing population. The 7-year Rule addressed
the problems associated with Hong Kong's ageing population not
primarily by saving on CSSA benefits that would have been given to new
elderly arrivals. Instead, this 7-year requirement allowed the Government
to save on CSSA benefits that would have been given to all new adult
arrivals (young or elderly), and to use these savings to support a growing
number of local elderly people in Hong Kong. This is evidenced by a
passage in the Task Force Report (cited again by the CFA), which states
the following:
21 Ibid., [55].
22 Ibid., [741.
23 Ibid., [75].
"One serious economic problem caused by an accelerated increase in the
number of elderly people in the population is social security payments. The
Government is committed to providing financial assistance to elderly people
in need".2 4
Thus, in determining whether the 7-year Rule was rationally connected
with the Government's aim of addressing the ageing population, the CFA
was wrong to have focused only on the savings the Government could
gain by excluding the elderly new arrivals from obtaining CSSA. Since
the 7-year Rule applied to all adult new arrivals, the Government could
save on CSSA that would otherwise have been given to all eligible adult
new arrivals and use the savings to provide for a rapidly growing number
of old people in Hong Kong. Thus, it is clear that there is a rational
connection between this Rule and the Government's aim of ensuring the
sustainability of the welfare system.
3(c) 7-Year Rule and the Rise in CSSA Expenditure
The CFA also held that there was no rational connection between
the 7-year Rule and the avowed legitimate aim since the Rule could
only achieve modest CSSA savings. While the CFA accepted that
the Governmental spending on CSSA had risen sharply in the decade
leading up to 2004, the CFA nevertheless concluded that the 7-year
restriction was an irrational way of safeguarding the sustainability of the
welfare system. Using the statistics for the fiscal year 2001-2002 as an
example, the CFA noted that if the 7-year Rule had been in effect then,
the Government would have saved less than $764 million out of a total
CSSA expenditure of $14.4 billion that year."5 According to the CFA,
such "relatively insignificant level of savings ... severely undermines "26
the suggestion the 7-year Rule was rationally connected to the avowed
legitimate aim of safeguarding the sustainability of the social security
aim. To further buttress its conclusion, the CFA pointed to a supposed
"smoking gun" found in a Governmental Information Paper dated 2
January 2004:
"The new residence requirements for CSSA are, however, not driven by the
need to reduce CSSA expenditure on new arrivals, but by the need to adopt
'the principle of seven-year residence requirement' for providing social
24 Ibid., [70]. The Task Force Report projected that the elderly dependency ratio in Hong Kong
would increase from 158 in 2002 to 380 in 2031.
25 Kong Yunming (CFA) (n 1 above), [94] and [95].
26 Ibid., [96].
Vol 44 Part 1 Judicial Over-enforcemnent of Social Welfare Rights 47
48 Po Jen Yap and Thomas Wong (2014) HKLJ
benefits heavily subsidized by public funds, as recommended by the Task
Force on Population Policy, to ensure a rational basis on which our public
resources are allocated. The Government remains committed to providing
an effective and sustainable safety net for the financially vulnerable". 27
(Italics supplied by the CFA)
The CFA therefore seized upon the phrase "not driven by the need to
reduce CSSA expenditure on new arrivals", and concluded triumphantly
that that 7-year Rule was not enacted for the purpose that the Government
had advanced.
Again, there are several problems with the CFA's arguments herein.
First, the Court erred in interpreting the Information Paper (in particular
the italicized part) as a concession by the Government that there was no
rational connection between the 7-year Rule and the avowed legitimate
aim. In fact, the extract, as cited by the CFA, went on to state that the
Government was committed to providing a "sustainable safety net for
the financially vulnerable". All that the Information Paper reveals is
that the ultimate objective of the 7-year Rule was not to reduce CSSA
expenditure on new arrivals per se, but to create a sustainable safety net
for the increasing number of financially vulnerable persons in Hong Kong
by saving on CSSA expenditures on new arrivals. The extracted part of
the Information Paper is thus not a "smoking gun" and the CFA has
simply misfired.
Second, the CFA has also misapplied the "rational connection" test
in determining whether there is nexus between the 7-year Rule and the
governmental aim of "curbing (CSSA) expenditure so as to ensure the
sustainability of the social security system"." In determining whether
there was any rational connection between the 7-year Rule and the
avowed legitimate aim, the only question to be asked should be whether
the impugned policy furthers the aim of the Government, ie whether the
7-year Rule would actually succeed in curbing any CSSA expenditure.
The fact that there was "relatively insignificant amount of savings"2
suggests that such savings actually occurred and a rational connection
can be established. Insofar as the CFA may feel that these savings are
insubstantial or insignificant, this would be an issue concerning the
"necessity" analysis and this finding would have no bearing on the issue
of rational connection. Therefore, by focusing on the quantum of savings
achievable by the 7-year Rule, the CFA had in fact engaged in the
"necessity" analysis, and the Court was no longer seeking to identify a
27 Ibid., [97].
28 Ibid., [140].
29 Ibid., [96].
rational connection between the 7-year Rule and the avowed legitimate
aim.
Third, even if the CFA had intended to engage in the "necessity"
analysis, it has failed to apply the correct standard of review. As recognized
by the CFA at the outset, the present case involved "the implementation
of the Government's socio-economic policy choices regarding the
allocation of limited public funds",30 and a wide margin of appreciation
should thus be accorded to the Government. 1 Therefore, the Court
would not subject the 7-year Rule to "intense scrutiny" (ie requiring
weighty evidence that it goes no further than necessary to achieve the
legitimate objective in question) or the "minimal impairment" test (ie
requiring the respondent to show that the impugned measure goes no
further than necessary to achieve the legitimate objective in question).
Instead, the Court would intervene only where the impugned measure is
"manifestly without reasonable justification".33
Notwithstanding the CFAs laudable rhetoric, the Court has indeed
applied intense scrutiny to examine the constitutionality of the 7-year Rule.
In the fiscal year 2001-2002, if the 7-year Rule had taken effect then, the
CFA noted that the Government could have saved about $764 million.34
(The total costs of the CSSA expenditure that year amounted to $14.4
billion.)3 1 On the assumption that these savings, from excluding affected
new arrivals (those that are currently in Hong Kong and also those that
would come in the future) under the 7-year Rule, would remain constant
every year after that, can one really argue that the impugned governmental
policy, which reduces CSSA expenditure by $764 million annually, is a
fiscal measure that is manifestly without reasonable foundation?
In support of its conclusion, the CFA also observed as follows:
"It is true that in subsequent years, the number of recipients who have not
resided here for seven years would progressively diminish. It nevertheless
remains the case that the actual savings would be proportionately reduced
by payments made to residents in that class for each year over the entire
seven-year period". 36
The CFA's abovementioned arguments are somewhat opaque to us but
arguably the CFA was making the following point: while the number
of welfare recipients, who do not satisfy the 7-year Rule but are still
30 Ibid., [41].
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., [40].
Ibid., [41].
Ibid., [95].
5 Ibid., [94].
6 Ibid., [951.
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given CSSA grants, would be reduced after the policy takes effect, the
government's savings from this would be offset by new payments made to
those who have resided beyond the 7-year requirement. If this is indeed
what the CFA meant, our judges may have missed the point. The fact is
there will be new arrivals coming to Hong Kong every year that would
over time be eligible for CSSA benefits. The 7-year Rule would have
required all these new arrivals to wait for seven years before they are
eligible for such benefits. While new arrivals, under the previous system,
were eligible for CSSA benefits after residing in Hong Kong for only a
year, new arrivals under the impugned policy would have to wait for an
additional six years. Where the Government is able to save on six years
of CSSA benefits that was previously payable to all new eligible arrivals
after one year, surely such cost savings cannot be considered "relatively
insignificant"."7 Therefore, so far as the CFA determined that the 7-year
Rule was a disproportionate measure, the judges surely must have applied
the "intense scrutiny" or "minimal impairment" analysis in substance,
albeit not endorsed it in form.
Restoration of the 1-Year Residence Requirement
Finally, even if the 7-year Rule was unconstitutional, we have grave
reservations about whether the 1-year residence requirement should have
been restored.
Our critics might argue that it would be logical for the CFA to restore
the 1-year residence requirement as the Court had held that Art 36
conferred constitutional protection on the "right defined by the eligibility
rules for CSSA derived from the previous system of social welfare and
in existence as at 1 July 1997"1,'3 and the CFA was thus merely restoring
the right to its original default position. But as Professor Albert Chen
has convincingly argued in his contribution, this interpretation of Art
36 is questionable as "the framers of the Basic Law in enacting [Art 36]
might not have intended to protect any particular social welfare right
that existed at the time of the 1997 handover against any subsequent
change in the relevant rules or policies, particularly where the change is
not retroactive. And in enacting [Art 145], their intention might have
been only to forbid any change that is so substantial as to amount to 'the
abandonment of the previous system"'".3 One must note that the CFA had
not cited any travaux preparatoires in support of this novel interpretation.
3 Ibid., [96].
3 Ibid., [35].
3 See Albert Chen, "A Stroke of Genius in Kong Yunming" (2014) 43 HKL] 7.
Moreover, the mere restoration of the 1-year residence rule does
not insulate this requirement from another constitutional challenge.40
In a subsequent constitutional challenge against this 1-year residence
requirement, assuming that the CFA is adamant that a 7-year residence
requirement would impede the exclusive goal of family reunion pursued
under the OWP scheme, the 1-year requirement would surely also affect
family reunion adversely. If savings to the CSSA expenditure from elderly
new arrivals "would be minimal and could hardly qualify as a response
to the ageing population problem, aimed at ensuring the sustainability
of the welfare system","1 surely savings gained from the excluded elderly
new arrivals under a 1-year requirement would be even more minimal.
If reductions in the CSSA expenditure, which followed from the 7-year
Rule, were deemed "relatively insignificant"" to be constitutional,
surely the reductions in savings from a 1-year rule would be even more
insignificant. If we accept the logic of the CFA's earlier arguments, the
1-year rule must be unconstitutional too, and it would be pointless to
restore this residence requirement.
Furthermore, even when courts deem certain governmental actions
unconstitutional, judges can still issue a temporary suspension order,
instead of specific injunctions, as the constitutional remedy of choice.
Professor Kent Roach has observed how the Supreme Court of Canada
has increasingly suspended the immediate application of its declarations
of invalidity, so that the government is given "an opportunity to engage
in policy-making, by deciding which of a range of multiple constitutional
options would be implemented in light of the court's ruling". This
judicial willingness to sanction delay and allow an unconstitutional state
of affairs to persist serves two-fold advantages. First, the suspension avoids
any legal uncertainty or chaos that may result in the community, if there
is an immediate vacuum or gap in the law, as the unconstitutional statute
will remain in place until the suspension order expires or a remedial
legislation/policy is put in place. Second, a suspended declaration
gives the political branches of government, rather than the courts, the
opportunity to make the initial selection on how best to comply with the
constitutional mandates among those competing alternatives available,
Our argument in this paragraph is subject to the caveat that the CFA (in paragraph 35 of its
judgment) was not stating that any eligibility rules for CSSA, which were in existence as at
1 July 1997, would never violate Art 36 of the Basic Law. We are of the view that the CFA is
unclear about this.
Kong Yunming (CFA) (n 1 above), [75].
42 Ibid., [96].
Kent Roach, "Remedial Consensus and Dialogue under the Charter: General Declarations and
Delayed Declarations of Invalidity" (2002) 35 University of British Columbia Law Review 211,
212.
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such that due deference is paid to the institutional and informational
capabilities of the Government."4
The Hong Kong courts have indeed issued temporary suspension
orders on several occasions." The first of such occasions related to the
unconstitutionality of a statutory provision that previously allowed
the Chief Executive, whenever he considered that public interest so
required, to order the interception or disclosure to the government of any
telecommunications, and an accompanying Executive Order that laid
out the administrative procedures for the conduct of authorised covert
surveillance. In Koo Sze Yiu v Chief Executive of Hong Kong,46 the CFA was
concerned that an immediate invalidation of the impugned procedures
would unduly hamper legitimate covert surveillance activities, and the
Court, inspired by its Canadian counterpart, suspended its declaration
of invalidity. Bokhary PJ, on behalf of the CFA, held that this judicial
power to suspend the operation of a declaration arose from the inherent
jurisdiction of the courts and was "concomitant of the power to make
the declaration in the first place". Equally significantly, the CFA
refused to compel the government to bring into force a pre-existing
but inoperative legislation that sought to regulate the interception
of some forms of communications as the judges preferred to "enable
the authorities to decide what course they wish to take"." Therefore,
the suspension order not only provides latitude to the government in
deciding how best to respond to the court's decision, it also gives time to
the legislature/executive to devise corrective legislation/administrative
policy.
The CFA herein should have done the same. In light of the fiscal
impact that this decision would have, and the administrative chaos
that may follow from a sudden upsurge in eligible CSSA applicants, the
CFA should have issued a temporary suspension order. This will give the
Government time to assess the range of options it can adopt, in lieu of a
7-year residence requirement, and decide independently on the best way
forward to comply with the Court's ruling, instead of being compelled to
enforce a 1-year residence rule that is irrational and illogical on the CFA's
own terms.
4 Bruce Ryder, "Suspending the Charter" (2003) 21 SCLR (2d) 267, 285.
W v Registrar of Marriages (2013) 16 HKCFAR 112; Chan Kin Sum Simon v Secretary foriustice
(unrep., HCAL 79, 82 and 83/2008, [2009] HKEC 393).
6 (2006) 9 HKCFAR 441.
Ibid., [35].
4 Ibid., [59] (concurring opinion by Sir Anthony Mason NPJ).
Conclusion
Socio-economic issues, such as public welfare, present the judiciary with
an institutional dilemma; in carrying out its reviewing role, judges usually
do not have all the information, expertise and training available to the
primary decision makers to assess the proportionality of the impugned
socio-economic policy; and deference is thus a rational, consequentialist
response to this epistemic uncertainty. So far as the judiciary does not
interfere with the government's fiscal solution unless it is "manifestly
without reasonable foundation"," the courts would be under-enforcing
the Constitution against public officials. But we should not equate "the
scope of a constitutional norm as coterminous with the scope of its
judicial enforcement".o The most prominent rationale for the judicial
under-enforcement of welfare rights is premised on the belief that the
political branches of government are better than judges in weighing costs
and benefits in such circumstances." Due to institutional constraints and
the informational costs associated with the adjudication of such social
welfare rights, judges may not want to exhaust the full content of these
constitutional norms so that the political branches of the government
can, on their own, flesh out the conceptual boundaries of these implicated
rights.
In matters such as public welfare, where resources are limited and
there are competing demands from different interest groups, our courts
are simply not equipped to make the difficult and agonizing decisions
of allocating funds from one segment of society to another. Judges are
neither philosopher kings nor economists extraordinaire. Alas, in Kong
Yunming, our CFA judges have decided that they are both.
' Kong Yunming (CFA) (n 1 above), [76].
o Lawrence G. Sagar, Justice in Plain Clothes: A Theory of American Constitutional Practice (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2004) 86.
I Kermit Roosevelt ILL, "Aspiration and Underenforcement" 119 (2006) Harvard Law Review 193.
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KONG YUNMING MANIFEST
UNREASONABLENESS: THE DOCTRINAL
FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF
WELFARE POLICY IN HONG KONG
O1
Eric C Ip*
It would be easy to overstate the expansive impact of the Court of Final
Appeal's controversial decision in Kong Yunming v Director of Social Welfare
on the right to social welfare, its effects in removing a significant obstacle
for new immigrants seeking social security payments notwithstanding.
The new test that the Court deployed for reviewing the constitutionality
of welfare policy is narrow and devoid of any commitment whatsoever to
abstract societal ideals; it resembled the proportionality doctrine at most in
form but definitely not in spirit. This article demonstrates how, properly
understood, the three stages of this test boils down to no more than one stage:
whether the impugned policy is manifestly unreasonable. This minimalist
standard, in many ways similar to Wednesbury irrationality, evidences the
Court's entrenchment of judicial deference in welfare policy adjudication
and conservative economic philosophy in the constitutional common law of
Hong Kong.
Introduction
On 17 December 2013, a unanimous Court of Final Appeal, in Kong
Yunming v Director of Social Welfare,' invalidated part of an Order in
Council for unconstitutionally requiring all recipients of social security
distributions under the Government's Comprehensive Social Security
Assistance (CSSA) scheme to have been Hong Kong residents for no
less than seven years. Removing a significant obstacle for new immigrants
seeking welfare benefits, this controversial ruling immediately ignited
widespread debate that has gone to the very heart of the territory's
economic ideology and political identity. Although social rights
adjudication of the kind undertaken in the present case can in theory
Assistant Dean (Undergraduate Student Affairs) and Assistant Professor of Law, Faculty of
Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong. The author is grateful to Frank Choi, the anonymous
reviewer, and the editor for their helpful comments. All errors are the author's own.
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provide a forum for judges, politicians and citizens to deliberate over such
sweeping and fundamental issues as social equality and integration, it is
worth noting that Ribeiro PJ's lead judgment, in which Ma CJ, Tang PJ
and Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers NPJ joined, neither promoted nor
resulted from any such triadic dialogue. In letter and spirit, the new test
that the Kong Yunming Court propounded for gauging the constitutionality
of limits on the right to social welfare is narrow, deferential, and devoid of
any appeal whatsoever to social ideals, its nullification of the restrictions
of pre-existing policy notwithstanding.
This note focuses on issues of common law doctrinal design underlying
that test - mislabelled "proportionality" in the judgment - which would
most accurately be denoted "manifest unreasonableness", and shall not be
concerned with how that doctrine was actually deployed in Kong Yunming,
or whether it is normatively desirable as the dominant standard for welfare
rights adjudication. It is organised as follows. Firstly, it will be demonstrated
how the three-stage analytic framework in Kong Yunming, correctly
understood, boils down to just one stage, and how it differs fundamentally
from the structured proportionality doctrine, being little more than a
permutation of Wednesbury irrationality review. Secondly, whatever its
potential importance, the lead judgment in Kong Yunming evidences
the doctrinal entrenchment of judicial deference to government welfare
policies and conservative economic philosophy in the constitutional
common law of Hong Kong. Thirdly, and perhaps counter-intuitively,
Kong Yunming confirmed that executive or legislative restrictions on socio-
economic rights, which do not simultaneously curb civil and political
rights, are permissible so long as they are not excessively irrational.
Kong Yunming Has Only One Step4
Kong Yunming arose out of an application for CSSA by one Kong
Yunming, a new immigrant from mainland China, one year after she
2 Karen Kong, "Right to Social Welfare" in Johannes Chan and CL Lim (eds), Law of the Hong
Kong Constitution (Hong Kong: Sweet and Maxwell, 2011) 789. See Rosalind Dixon, "Creating
Dialogue about Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-form versus Weak-form Judicial Review
Revisited" (2007) 5(3) International ]ournal of Constitutional Law 391.
Bokhary NPJ reached the same outcome that the seven-year residence requirement imposed by
the impugned Order in Council on CSSA applicants was unconstitutional, albeit on grounds
that were very different from and much broader than those relied on by Ribeiro PJ in his lead
judgment. As a matter of law, the reasons Bokhary NPJ gave cannot bind the courts below as
part of the ratio decidendi of the Court of Final Appeal's decision in Kong Yunming v Director of
Social Welfare. For commentary on Bokhary NPJ's opinion, see Karen Kong's contribution to the
present issue: Karen Kong, "Kong Yunming v Director of Social Welfare: Implications for Law and
Policy on Social Welfare" (2014) 43 HKL] 67.
This sub-heading was inspired by Matthew Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule, "Chevron has
Only One Step" (2009) 95 Virginia Law Review 597.
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had settled in Hong Kong, that the Director of Social Welfare rejected
on the ground that Kong failed to meet the afore-mentioned seven-year
residence requirement. The rejection was upheld by the Social Security
Appeal Board on the same ground. Kong brought suit for judicial
review before the High Court, claiming that the residence requirement
breaches Arts 36 and 25 of the Basic Law, which provide for residents'
rights to social welfare "in accordance with law" and equality before the
law, respectively. Article 36, however, is qualified by Art 145, which
empowers the Government "[o]n the basis of the previous social welfare
system ... on its own, [to] formulate policies on the development and
improvement of this system in the light of the economic conditions and
social needs".
At first instance, Andrew Cheung J was of the view that the Chief
Executive's Order in Council of 2004 lengthening the CSSA residence
requirement from one to seven years "is not something that the courts
are constitutionally entitled, and institutionally equipped, to interfere
with"; ' for "it is really a matter of politics for Government officials and
politicians, not for the courts and judges". 6 An administrative act is
unconstitutional as breaching Art 145's "development and improvement"
requirement only if it has been shown to have discriminated against "a
class of residents of Hong Kong in terms of their entitlement to social
welfare".' This ruling interpreted Art 36 in a way that diminished the
status of its social welfare provision as a stand-alone right: it has not
been breached unless Art 145 and ultimately Art 25 have also been
breached.' Andrew Cheung J applied a version of the proportionality
doctrine known as the "justification test" to gauge whether the seven-
year residence requirement pursued a legitimate aim, was rationally
related to it, and was "no more than necessary" to accomplish it. ' He
concluded that the differential treatment satisfied all three aspects of the
test and was thus constitutional. On appeal, this decision was upheld
by the Court of Appeal, which agreed "the case boiled down to the
question of discrimination".10 Interrogating the Order in Council, "do
the distinctions based on the length of residence pursue a legitimate aim;
if so, are the measures adopted rationally connected to that aim; and,
if so, has the Director shown that the differences in treatment are no
Kong Yunming v Director of Social Welfare [200914 HKLRD 382, 416 (CFI).
6 Ibid., p 417.
Ibid., p 401.
Karen Kong, "Adjudicating Social Welfare Rights in Hong Kong" (2012) 10(2) International
Journal of Constitutional Law 588, 591.
9 Kong Yunming (CFI) (n 5 above), pp 415-416.
10 Kong Yunming v Director of Social Welfare [201214 HKC 180 (CA).
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more than are necessary to accomplish that aim?", Stock V-P affirmed its
constitutionality. 11
The Court of Final Appeal, however, reframed the issue in terms of the
right itself to "social welfare in accordance with law". It is an approach
which "has the advantage of dispensing with proof of the element of
discrimination"." Ribeiro PJ, speaking for the Court, reproved the Court
of Appeal for allowing "equality rights entirely to eclipse the welfare
right", and for omitting to "attribute any meaning to the first sentence
of Article 36".14 Before Kong Yunming it had been unclear whether the
structured proportionality doctrine is applicable to judicial review of
welfare policy in cases not involving challenges based on discrimination.15
Ribeiro PJ declared that "any restriction subsequently placed on [the Art
36 right] is subject to constitutional review by the Courts on the basis of a
proportionality analysis". 16 The Court accordingly purported to follow the
typical proportionality analysis by articulating in three stages its inquiry
into the constitutionality of restrictions on Art 36 rights. In Stage One
the Court must ask whether the restriction pursues "a legitimate societal
aim". If so, it must determine, in Stage Two, whether the restriction is
"rationally connected with the achievement of that end". If it is, the
Court must ask in Stage Three whether the restriction is "manifestly
without reasonable foundation"."
Stage Three reaffirmed the Court's earlier ruling in Fok Chun Wa v
Hospital Authority," in which the policy of denying non-resident spouses
of residents' eligibility for subsidised medical services at public hospitals
was upheld by Ma CJ on the grounds that, "where limited public funds
are involved, the courts have recognized that lines have had to be drawn
by the executive or the legislature" which will not be disturbed unless
"shown to be manifestly without reasonable foundation"." A manifestly
disproportionate act is likelier than not to be irrational as well, and has
been understood as such by leading common law courts.zo The manifest
unreasonableness doctrine confirmed by the UK Supreme Court in
Humphreys v Revenue and Customs Commissioners is "little different from
" Ibid., [6].
12 Kong Yunming (CFA) (n 1 above), [19].
1 Ibid., [21].
1 Ibid., [32].
1 See Kong (n 2 above), p 799.
16 Kong Yunming (CFA) (n 1 above), [36].
17 Ibid., [43].
1 (2012) 15 HKCFAR 409.
19 Ibid., p 43 8 .
20See Jonathan Auburn et al., Judicial Review: Principles and Procedure (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013) 403.
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the domestic test of Wednesbury unreasonableness". 1 The two standards,
according to that Court, are interchangeable." A Wednesbury unreasonable
or irrational act is one that is "so unreasonable that no reasonable
authority could ever have come to it";" or "so absurd that no sensible
person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority";
or "so unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in
bad faith";" or "so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral
standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question
to be decided could have arrived at it"." Wednesbury's "built-in respect"
26 for discretionary power renders challenges under it "rarely" successful."
In brief, simple unreasonableness is not enough; to be invalidated, an
act must be intolerably unreasonable. Unlike judicial review principles
typically categorised under the head of "illegality", Wednesbury does not
require authorities to offer a point estimate of the "correct" decision
(which in practice means one they believe will be approved by a court),
but affords them a wide "policy space" of permissible discretion. Hence,
in the words of Ma CJ, a socio-economic policy is "manifestly without
reasonable foundation" only if it is "manifestly beyond the spectrum of
reasonableness".
The Court of Final Appeal's express substitution of a "manifest
unreasonableness" for the standard "minimal impairment" test (whether
the restriction of a right went "no further than necessary to achieve
the legitimate objective in question") 29 renders the Kong Yunming
test categorically distinct from any proportionality doctrine ordinarily
understood. As the foundation of such a doctrine,30 "proportionality"
stricto sensu requires authorities to act not merely within the gamut of
reasonableness, but as far as possible consistently with a "hypothetical
alternative"," to which the restriction of the protected right would be
the least oppressive. It obliges the courts not simply to evaluate whether
the act of a public authority is rational or reasonable, but more exactly,
to gauge whether its effects on rights have met a "minimum impairment"
21 [2012] 1 WLR 1545, [27].
22 Ibid., [26].
23 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223, 234.
24 Ibid., p 229.
25 CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 410.
26 James Goodwin, "The Last Defence of Wednesbury" [2012] Public Law 445.
27 Lord Irvine of Lairg, Human Rights, Constitutional Law and the Development of the English Legal
System (Oxford: Hart, 2003) 145.
28 Fok Chun Wa (n 18 above), p 441.
29 Kong Yunming (CFA) (n 1 above), [40].
30 Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2012) 458.
31 Ibid., p 326.
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standard." It follows that a proportionate act cannot be manifestly
unreasonable, but not necessarily vice versa:" it is entirely possible for
an act that disproportionately impairs a right to pass muster as not
manifestly unreasonable. The latter standard implies, after all, that the
public acts to which it is applied should be struck down only in the rarest
of circumstances.34
Recall now that, at Stage One of the Kong Yunming manifest
unreasonableness, a reviewing court must inquire whether or not the
restriction pursues a "legitimate societal aim". The Kong Yunming Court
articulated such an aim vaguely, as one "which furthers the legitimate
interests of society".35 The reviewing court must bear in mind that an Art 36
right to social welfare is one "which intrinsically involves the Government
setting rules determining eligibility and benefit levels" when determining
the legitimacy of a conflicting societal aim, "where the Courts acknowledge
a wide margin of discretion for the Government".36 This margin of discretion
or appreciation implies that in the instant case the Court was constrained
to defer to both the Government and Legislative Council in light of
their informational advantages and policy prerogatives.37 Previously, the
Court had acknowledged in Fok Chun Wa v Hospital Authority that public
authorities, when formulating and implementing social policies and budgets,
must take into account multiple factors and interests that "often pull in
different directions";3 ' remarking obiter that "[i]n the area of qualification
for social benefits or social welfare, the courts have consistently upheld
legislation or acts which have drawn the line at residence status".
It is not difficult to understand why, given the relevance of the margin of
appreciation in Stage One, a societal aim must be Wednesbury irrational in
order to be judicially regarded as illegitimate. To adopt an aim for a policy
is to give decisive or overarching weight to one consideration over other
considerations. To give decisive or overarching weight to an illegitimate aim
must be the same as giving decisive or overarching weight to an irrelevant
consideration, for illegitimacy necessarily entails irrelevancy. It is trite law
that, in the course of policy formulation, if an authority gives decisive or
overarching weight to an irrelevant consideration, it is tantamount to acting
2 Auburn et al. (n 20 above), p 4 0 3 .
Paul Daly, A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope (New York:
Cambridge University Press 2012), 204.
Ibid., p 181.
Kong Yunming (CFA) (n 1 above), [49].
6 Ibid., [42].
Johannes Chan and CL Lim, "Interpreting Constitutional Rights and Permissible Restrictions"
in Johannes Chan and CL Lim (eds), Law of the Hong Kong Constitution (Hong Kong: Sweet and
Maxwell, 2011) 495.
Fok Chun Wa (n 18 above), p 436.
Ibid., p 43 9 .
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irrationally in the Wednesbury sense.40 Put concretely, like the traditional
Wednesbury inquiry, the authority is not required to supply a point estimate
of the "correct" answer at Stage One, but simply a justification that lies
within the gamut of legitimate aims. In fact, the Kong Yunming Court had
clearly conceded that Stage One and Stage Three inquiries are basically
the same: "If the restriction has to rest on such [illegitimate] purposes,
it must be viewed as a restriction that is manifestly without reasonable
foundation."41 It assumed - without explanation - that the Government's
professed aim in requiring seven years' residence to qualify for CSSA,
namely "ensuring the financial sustainability of the social security system" 42
was legitimate. Yet in the following words it doubted whether this was the
true objective underlying the impugned policy, "perhaps ... the seven-year
residence requirement originated, not in a specialist social welfare review,
but as something of a side-wind deriving from a long-term population
policy study ... "4 According to the Court, a population policy premised
on a "threat" posed to "fundamental social welfare values - values which
have received constitutional acknowledgement in Article 36" must be an
illegitimate societal aim.44
Much judicial ink has been spilled on the Stage Two question: whether
the CSSA seven-year residence requirement was rationally connected to
the Government's above-mentioned stated legitimate aim. The Court
of Final Appeal concluded that, "far from the seven-year requirement
being a rational measure to mitigate the ageing population problem (and
thereby contributing to the sustainability of our social security system),
it is a counter-productive and irrational measure".45 Unlike Stage One,
the question raised by the rational connection test in Stage Two is not
whether the means are desirable, or whether there are more desirable
means. 46 The means are not required to be efficient;47 "rationality" is
conceived merely as a logical connection of ends to means.4S Even in the
context of positive rights, all that is demanded is that the act has more
than a minimal probability of fulfilling legitimate aims, if only partially.49
It is often "undistinguishable" from Wednesbury irrationality.o
Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143; Hilaire Barnett, Constitutional and
Administrative Law (London: Cavendish Publishing, 4th ed, 2002) 869.
Kong Yunming (CFA) (n 1 above), [141], emphasis added.
42 Ibid., [143].
Ibid., [I11].
Ibid.
Ibid., [73], emphasis added.
6 Barak (n 30 above), p 305.
Ibid.
4 Henry Woolf et al. De Smith's Judicial Review (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 7th ed, 2013) 629.
4 Barak (n 30 above), p 432.
o Ibid., p 376.
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It is clear enough by now that Stage One illegitimacy and Stage
Two irrationality are no more than two facets of Stage Three manifest
unreasonableness. All Stage One and Stage Two determinations may
therefore just as well be couched in Stage Three terms." The Kong
Yunming judgment itself evinces the mutually convertible nature of the
three steps. First Ribeiro PJ argued that the:
"grounds [advanced by the Director of Welfare as separate purposes
supplying independent legitimate aims capable of justifying the restriction
of the Article 36 right] are, in my view, so lacking in coherence that they
cannot properly serve as legitimate aims for the restriction. Alternatively,
if they do serve as such purposes, they are such insubstantial and socially
insignificant aims that the restriction of the Article 36 right is a wholly
disproportionate measure to achieve them, making it a measure that is
manifestly without reasonable foundation:.52
Next he premised that:
"If the restriction is not rationally connected to the avowed legitimate
purpose or if the inroads it makes into the protected right are manifestly
without reasonable foundation, the Court may declare the measure
unconstitutional".53
Finally, he concluded that:
"the Director has not made good the proposition that the seven-year
residence requirement was rationally connected to the aforesaid legitimate
aim. If there was any rational connection, the restriction was wholly
disproportionate and manifestly without reasonable foundation, given its
contradictory policy consequences and socially insubstantial benefits".54
And whilst the lead judgment did not expressly engage with Stage Three
analysis, a passage from it suggests that its reasoning did so in fact:
"There is no evidence as to the level of savings actually achieved and
achievable as a result of adopting the seven-year rule. On the contrary,
everything points to the actual savings being modest and of an order
that cannot sensibly be described as designed to safeguard the system's
sustainability. The Government has indeed admitted that the new residence
requirement is not driven by the need to reduce CSSA expenditure on
new arrivals".55
Stephenson and Vermeule (n 4 above), p 599.
2 Kong Yunming (CFA) (n 1 above), [101], emphasis added.
Ibid., [139], emphasis added.
Ibid., [143], emphasis added.
55 Ibid., [140], emphasis added.
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Likewise, though Ribeiro PJ did not openly attack the legitimacy of the
societal aim claimed by the Government, he chided the Government
in Stage One terms for "abdicat[ing] responsibility for addressing the
right conferred by Article 36 on Hong Kong residents to social welfare in
accordance with law".56
All in all, the Court's lead judgment can be summarised in these
terms: "the impugned portion of the Order in Council was manifestly
unreasonable". Artificially decomposing a manifest unreasonableness
inquiry into a three-step process, however, suggests what the Kong
Yunming doctrine is not: it cannot be said to be a structured test of
justification, like proportionality applied to restrictions on civil and
political rights, which admits varying levels of intensity of review
in various types of cases. 7 Manifest unreasonableness review is
considerably rigid (and unrigorous, given the margin of appreciation),
and a three-stage framework may mislead reviewing courts to believe
they must always address the "sub-species" of manifest unreasonableness
crystallised in Stage One and Stage Two before determining whether
the impugned act is manifestly unreasonable on the whole.5 ' At the end
of the day, an act impairing rights that is rooted in an illegitimate aim
or thoroughly illogical is bound to be manifestly unreasonable; equally,
an act manifestly without reasonable foundation cannot be founded
on, or logically connected to, a legitimate aim, if legitimacy entails a
substantial degree of reasonableness. It is needless to resolve Stages One
and Two before Stage Three, despite that the choice to include the heads
of illegitimacy and irrational connection as non-exhaustive indicators
of manifest unreasonableness does have the potential of rendering the
reviewing court's reasoning more transparent. Above all, the inner logic
of landmark judicial rulings is often not adequately reflected in their
language, the abandonment of which can make things clearer without
any loss of substance.
Discussion
The Court of Final Appeal in Kong Yunming v Director of Social Welfare
established the status of the right to social welfare as self-sufficient,
independent of the right of equality for its enforcement. But it also
decisively affirmed the acceptance of "the terminology of reasonableness
16 Ibid., [142].
* Woolf et al. (n 48 above), p 637.
* Stephenson and Vermeule (n 4 above), p 606.
5 Ibid., p 609.
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as the general review standard"60 in cases involving socio-economic
rights. The Court's adoption of the manifest unreasonableness standard
amounts to rejection of the more demanding and intrusive doctrine of
proportionality in favour of a version of Wednesbury irrationality for
judicial review of socio-economic policy. Significantly, a reviewing court
will not have to ask, as in civil and political rights cases, whether the
restriction of a socio-economic entitlement is appropriate and necessary
to strike a proper balance and avoid excessive burdens as far as possible.61
Doctrinally, Wednesbury irrationality in administrative law is
distinguishable from manifest unreasonableness in constitutional law
only in that this latter places the burden of proof not on the claimant
to demonstrate irrationality,62 but on the public authority to produce
a justification - to which the courts are obliged to accord a margin
of appreciation - just sufficient to rebut the allegation of manifest
unreasonableness.63 In practice, however, the manifest unreasonableness
test must prove more exacting than the traditional Wednesbury test,64 in
that the decision-maker's duty to justify its decision will constantly tempt
a reviewing court to scrutinise more closely the evidentiary basis of the
justification.65
Additionally, the Kong Yunming Court, by rejecting proportionality
of whatever intensity as classically understood as the standard test for
reviewing social policy, "hardwired" into Hong Kong constitutional law
both judicial deference and conservative principles of law and economics.
It did not hesitate to expand on these principles so as to bind lower courts
through the doctrine of precedent, opining that "[t]he Article 36 right
to social welfare is not a fundamental right but a right which intrinsically
involves the Government setting rules determining eligibility and benefit
levels";66 that "Article 145 does not preclude the elimination or reduction
of particular welfare benefits if that proves necessary to develop, improve
or maintain the sustainability of the welfare system as a whole"; 67 and that
"by reducing standard payments in 1999 in relation to larger households
and reducing standard payments across-the-board in 2003 and 2004",
the Government had taken "rational measures ... genuinely" consistent
with a "legitimate aim of curbing expenditure on CSSA with a view
Michael Ramsden, "Using the ICESCR in Hong Kong Courts" (2012) 42(3) HKL] 839, 862.
61 Michael Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 6th ed, 2012) 427.
62 Daly (n 33 above), p 2 5 4.
6 Andrew Le Sueur, "The Rise and Ruin of Unreasonableness?" (2005) 10 Judicial Review 32, 42.
6 Paul Craig, "The Nature of Reasonableness Review" (2013) 66 Current Legal Problems 131, 166.
65 Ibid., p 165.
66 Kong Yunming (CFA) (n 1 above), [42], emphasis added.
67 Ibid., [37].
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to ensuring the financial sustainability of the social security system".6
Such conservatism is arguably at odds with Art 4 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which provides
that restrictions on socio-economic rights must be "compatible with
the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the
general welfare in a democratic society". But it is clearly consistent with
the Basic Law, which could not have been intended to transform Hong
Kong into a welfare state.69 The terms "development and improvement"
in Art 145, accordingly, must permit both expansion and reduction in
the level of social welfare provision.70 This should surprise no one, for as a
"charter of capitalism" the Basic Law embodies a "striking bias in favour
of market economics",n if not outright hostility towards welfarism."
We must never forget that the Basic Law was an endeavour to "freeze"
the original constitution of the former British dependent territory as it
stood immediately before 4 April 1990,14 leaving the Hong Kong way of
life undisturbed to the farthest extent; not least the free-wheeling non-
interventionist nature of the pre-1997 system, which had provided but
little social security.
Conclusion
It would be easy to overstate the expansive impact of Kong Yunming on
the right to social welfare. Ribeiro PJ's lead judgment struck down the
CSSA seven-year residence requirement, not on the basis of some abstract
social philosophy, but on the much narrower grounds of administrative
irrationality and illogicality. The test propounded by the Court resembled
the proportionality doctrine at most in form but definitely not in spirit.
Kong Yunming sealed the doctrinal fate of constitutional judicial review
of social welfare policy in Hong Kong. The right to social welfare may
66 Ibid., [143].
69 See Kong (n 2 above), p 792.
" Ramsden (n 60 above), p 842; PY Lo, The Hong Kong Basic Law (Hong Kong: LexisNexis,
2011), 237.
1 Yash Ghai, "The Rule of Law and Capitalism: Reflections on the Basic Law" in Raymond Wacks
(ed), Hong Kong, China and 1997: Essays in Legal Theory (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University
Press, 1993) 343-365.
7 Yash Ghai, Hong Kong's New Constitutional Order: The Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty and the
Basic Law (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2nd ed, 1999) 241.
7 Leo E Goodstadt, Poverty in the Midst of Affluence: How Hong Kong Mismanaged its Prosperity
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013) 2.
7 Raymond Wacks, "One Country, Two Grundnormen? The Basic Law and the Basic Norm" in
Raymond Wacks (ed), Hong Kong, China and 1997: Essays in Legal Theory (Hong Kong: Hong
Kong University Press) 169-170.
7 See Ghai (n 72 above), p 4 3 7.
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have become a constitutional right in its own right, but the substance of
any restriction on it can be questioned by a reviewing court only when
the decision-maker fails to defend the preceding decision-making process
as not being flawed in the Wednesbury sense. Genuine proportionality
analysis, even one of low intensity, will no longer be appropriate for the
scrutiny of limitations to socio-economic rights per se. What is more,
the Court's justification for restraint in welfare rights adjudication is
rooted not merely in traditional concerns about comity with the political
branches, but also in a much deeper judicial commitment to conservative
economic thinking.
The vantage-point of manifest unreasonableness, nevertheless, lets
us see that, whereas a serviceable latitude affords to public authorities
that flexibility and responsiveness which is indispensable to modulating
public policy in every advantageous and permissible way, untrammelled
discretion encourages arbitrary rule, "the antithesis of rationality";76 the
abuse of public power, "with indifference as to whether it will serve the
purposes which alone can justify" it,77 and "unresponsive to reason".78
This in turn causes an erosion of predictability79 and, ultimately, undue
suppression of individual freedoms. 0 It may be reliably concluded, then,
that even CSSA residence requirements considerably lengthier than
one year would not be intrinsically unconstitutional, Kong Yunming
notwithstanding, so long as the relevant public authorities did not reach
the decision arbitrarily,1 as in the present case. And the same principle
applies to limitations on other forms of welfare provision, as distinct from
fundamental civil and political rights, like equal justice under law. In any
event, the Court of Final Appeal's doctrinal insistence on administrative
acts, even popular ones, to be minimally rational, must be applauded for
living out the common law maxim "fiat justitia, ruat caelum"."
76 Denis Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1986) 143.
n Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2009) 219.
* Timothy Endicott, Administrative Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2011) 625.
'9 Raz (n 77 above), p 220.
Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of
Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 58-59.
I Kong Yunming manifest unreasonableness is not dissimilar to the test of arbitrariness deployed by
the Court of Final Appeal for reviewing the constitutionality of statutory criminal punishments,
see Lau Cheong v HKSAR (2002) 5 HKCFAR 415.
2 See R v Wilkes (1770) 4 Burr 2527, 2561-2562 (Lord Mansfield CJ).
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